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1 Introduction
The nancial and economic crisis that started in 2008 has generated strong growth in the
unemployment rate in many OECD countries. More specically, the average unemploy-
ment rate increased by 3 percentage points in OECD countries between 2007 and the rst
quarter of 2010. The increase in the unemployment rate has been dramatic in countries
like Spain, where it rose from 8.3% to 19%.
These results have begun to encourage important debates, at political and academic
levels, on possible reforms of the labor market in the OECD countries most a¤ected by
this problem. It has been suggested to modify the system of collective bargaining in those
countries characterized by wage bargaining at sector level to models of negotiation that
generate higher wage moderation, and thus higher employment.
These proposals are based on the seminal article by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988), where
the worst result, in terms of employment, was obtained in a model where the wage was
negotiated at sector level. They pointed out that highly centralized (at national or multi-
industry level) and decentralized (at the rm level) bargaining systems perform better
than intermediate ones (at sector/industry level) on wage demands. This inverted-U shape
between unemployment and the degree of centralization of the wage bargaining arises from
Calmfors and Dri¢ lls assumption that, as centralization increases, the goods produced by
sectors whose unions set the wage together are closer substitutes. We present a di¤erent
explanation for this inverted-U shape: the role that market power and other institutional
characteristics have on the unemployment rate when the wage is set at sector level. For
simplicity, we consider only three di¤erent wage setting systems: Firm (the wage is set in
each rm), sector (one same wage is set for all rms in one sector) and national level (one
same wage is set for all sectors). Moreover, we introduce growth in the model because
we consider that it is important to check whether the inverse U hypothesis holds also for
other economic variables, for example, long run income per capita.
We develop a disequilibrium unemployment model, without labor market frictions,
in a monopolistic competition set up with the innite horizon model of growth (see, for
example Galí (1996)). Monopolistic competition in the goods market with non frictional
unemployment has received a lot of attention in the recent literature see, for example,
Arnsperger and De la Croix (1990), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Dutt and Sen
(1997), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004)1. However, there has been little
research on the interaction between reforms in the wage bargaining system and product
market power in order to increase the employment level. Moreover, we also consider how
these reforms may a¤ect income per capita in the neoclassical growth model.
1Ebell and Haefke (2003), Delacroix (2006) and García-Sánchez and Vázquez-Méndez (2008) investi-
gated models with di¤erents wage setting systems, imperfect competition and frictional unemployment
due to matching problems.
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Models with non frictional unemployment, perfect competition in the goods market and
growth are used for analyzing various issues2. For example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000),
with an OLG model, show how labor taxes a¤ect employment and long run growth when
there is an externality in production. Doménech and García (2008), using an innite
horizon growth model, introduce some of these institutional characteristics presented in
this paper and analyze how they a¤ect the employment rate. All these papers make
assumptions that imply a constant unemployment rate derived via the wage equation and
assuming that the unemployment benet grows with income per capita 3. In a monopolistic
competition set up with an OLG model for growth, Brauninger (2000) studied the e¤ects
of unemployment on income per capita in the long run. However, this paper does not take
into account di¤erent wage bargaining systems.
We compare the wages set at rm, sector and national (centralized) levels, their un-
employment rates and growth in economic variables, for the Cobb-Douglas production
function, in order to see under which conditions the hump shaped hypothesis between the
unemployment rate and the degree of centralization, postulated by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll
(1988), holds for the unemployment rate and income per capita.
We use the monopolistic competition set up because it is the natural framework for
obtaining di¤erent labor demand elasticities with respect to the real wage when wages are
set at rm, sector and national levels. More specically, the elasticity is lower at sector
level than rm and centralized levels and higher elasticity, as we will see, provides strong
incentives to moderate wage demands. The idea that changing from sector to centralized
level results in an increase in labor demand elasticity appears in Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991). Moreover, they also justify the existence of full employment when wages
are set at national level. Hoel (1990) extended the well-known union model developed by
Layard, Nickell and Jackman adding at rm level wage setting and justifying the hump-
shaped hypothesis. In this paper we upgrade Hoel´s (1990) framework to obtain the labor
demand function from economic fundamentals.
The existence and consideration of product market power is one of the reasons that
produces the inverted-U shape in this paper. We introduce other institutional charac-
teristics that also a¤ect wage determination and employment rates, such as the size and
structure of social expenditures, public sector ine¢ ciencies, the degree of internalization of
the contribution of labor income to the provision of social services and labor taxes. This
study may be used to analyze under what circumstances these variables may change the
inverted-U e¤ect.
Our analysis shows that a high degree of market power normally produces the inverted-
2Raurich and Sorolla (2011) present a survey about this topic.
3However, Kaas and von Thadden (2003) present an OLG growth model with perfect competition,
disequilibrium unemployment and a CES production function. In this framework, the change of production
function produces that the employment rate depends on capital. For a more thorough discussion of these
assumptions see Raurich and Sorolla (2011).
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U form for unemployment. Moreover, we also illustrate that this inverted-U form can be
reversed when the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of social services
is great enough at sector level. In general, the existing literature assumes that there is
only complete internalization at national level (Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)). We
extend internalization considering that there is some degree of internalization of scal
externalities at sector level, that does not only depend on the wage setting system but
also has a demographic or institutional component4.
The ndings of this study are important for two reasons. First, as we will see in the
next section, the values of some of the institutional variables that we introduce in the
model are really di¤erent across countries. This means that trying to check the inverse
U hypothesis by looking only at the level of centralization, without controlling for all the
other variables, may result in the inverse U hypothesis not appearing in the empirical
evidence (for an excellent survey see Aidt and Tzannatos (2008)).
Second, analysis of the wage set at sector level allows us to discuss alternative strate-
gies for changing the factors that determine this wage rather than changing the wage
setting system in order to reduce unemployment. More specically, our results suggest
that for countries with sector wage-bargaining, where unions internalize social services, it
may be better to decrease market power or to change other institutional characteristics
rather than change the wage setting system from a sector wage-bargaining structure to a
decentralized system. This type of result gives alternative or complementary strategies to
those presented in the OECD Jobs Study (1994) for improving employment levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the labor market
performance of OECD countries, over the period 1998-2008, and relates this performance to
labor market institutions and relevant characteristics that appear in the theoretical model.
In section 3 we characterize the equilibrium employment rate at rm and sector level. The
model is built on three basic assumptions: monopolistic competition in the product market,
wage setting by bargaining between rms and unions subject to rms labor demand curve
and, nally, the ability of trade unions to partially internalize the social service provided
by the government. Section 4 focuses on the equilibrium employment rate at national level
under di¤erent assumptions made by trade unions. Section 5 adds a simple neoclassical
4The idea of the internalization of scal externalities in wage-bargaining at sector level is present in
the literature in a very disperse and slightly systematic form. In spite of this, there are articles where this
issue appears with a more or less formal argument. For example, Pohjola (1992) presents a model where
the externality can be internalized through cooperative behavior by a trade union in a framework of wage
bargaining at sector level. The paper also shows, with informational imperfections, that the cooperative
solution can be a sustained equilibrium when economic activity is low. The OECD Employment Outlook
(2007) has included an explicit recommendation to increase the link between taxes and social protection
benets in order to reduce the negative impact that the overall tax wedge may exert on employment. In
his review of Calforms and Dri¢ ll (1988) paper, Dri¢ ll (2006) highlights the need to "take account of
informal coordination of bargaining across groups". In theoretical terms, our paper is most closely related
to Mares (2004). She presents a model with an explicitly internalization by unions of social expenditure
and takes into account the composition of social policy transfers.
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model of growth to analyze the relationship between income per capita and the wage
bargaining system. The paper concludes with a summary of the main results.
2 Stylized facts for some OECD countries.
Many of the articles that have been written in the last few decades about unemployment
focus on explaining the substantial di¤erences in the level and evolution of the unem-
ployment rate across OECD countries. The poor performance of the unemployment rate
is explained by shocks and di¤erences in institutions or the interaction of both5. It is
important to note that the collective bargaining system appears as a key element in all
this literature. More specically, a large body of empirical research has conrmed that
wage bargaining at sector level produces more unemployment than more decentralized or
centralized wage bargaining systems.
Table 1 presents the classication of many OECD countries by their collective bar-
gaining system in three groups that we have named ANGLO, EUCON and NORDIC.
For this country classication we use the product of bargaining level, union density and
bargaining coordination relative to the value for Finland6. It is important to be clear that
coordination of wage bargaining is di¤erent from bargaining centralization. The bargain-
ing centralization tends to be used to refer to the level of wage bargaining (rm, sector
or central level) while bargaining coordination has been applied to situations where the
parties are able to internalize the implications of wage settlements in the unemployment
rate. Thus, coordination can also be achieved even if bargaining is conducted at rm or
industry level.
According to our theoretical classication between rm, sector and national wage set-
ting systems we identify ANGLO with rm, EUCON with sector and NORDIC with
national7.
The rst variable presented in Table 2 is the harmonized unemployment rate from
OECD statistics (U). As mentioned above, Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) found a hump-
shaped relationship between an index of coordination and the unemployment rate. We
examine these issues below taking into account our relative index of collective bargaining.
5An excellent survey on these issues can be found in Blanchard (2006).
6The Bargaining level is an index of bargaining centralization with a range {1,3}. More specically,
1= Company/plant level, 2= sectorial level and 3 = Central level. Union Coverage refers to the number
of workers covered by collective agreements normalized on employment. Coordination is an index of
bargaining coordination with a range {1,5} between employers and employees. Source: Database Nickell
(2006).
7Calforms and Dri¢ ll (1988) have ranked countries according to similar criteria. More secically, in
his paper the ranking is based on the sum of bargaining level and Coordination. The di¤erence between
our classication and that elaborated by Calforms and Dri¢ ll (1988), whithin the same dates, is slight.
However, we include union coverage in our classication due to the importance of extensions to collective
contracts in Europe whether unionized or not. For more details, see chapter 3 of the OECD Employment
Outlook (2004).
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Table 1
Some labour markets institutional indicators in OECD countries.
Bargaining Union Coordination Relative
level Coverage Product
ANGLO
USA 1 0.2 1 0.02
Canada 1.1 0.37 1.3 0.04
Japan 1 0.23 4 0.08
UK 1.3 0.57 1.8 0.12
New Zealand 1.6 0.5 3 0.21
EUCON
France 2 0.91 2 0.32
Switzerland 1.8 0.52 4 0.33
Greece 2 0.9 3 0.47
Australia 2 0.83 3.4 0.50
Italy 2.4 0.84 2.8 0.5
Denmark 2.3 0.72 4 0.58
Netherlands 2.1 0.8 4 0.59
Spain 2.5 0.75 3.7 0.61
Germany 2 0.87 4 0.61
Belgium 2 0.89 4 0.62
Portugal 2.5 0.75 3.8 0.63
Ireland 2.5 0.9 3.2 0.63
NORDIC
Sweden 2.48 0.87 3.4 0.64
Norway 2.6 0.7 4.3 0.69
Austria 2 0.96 4.4 0.74
Finland 2.5 0.95 4.8 1
Source: Database Nickell (2006).
Figure 1 plots a scatter diagram of the unemployment rate against our relative index. In
this period of time there is no evidence in favor of the hump hypothesis. Consequently,
we nd practically no relationship between an ordinary least squares regression of un-
employment using our relative index and its square root (R2 = 0; 03). However, if we
omit the date of Finland, we obtain an inverted-U shaped curve and a better regression
(R2 = 0:11)8.
8Finland su¤ered particularly negative external shocks from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990
and a severe nancial crisis. The unemployment rate jumped from 3.2% in 1990 to more than 16.7%.
just four years later.
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Figure 1. Unemployment vs relative index of collective bargaining.
This paper gives rigorous theoretical underpinnings for the link between the unemploy-
ment and economic growth rates with collective bargaining systems at rm, industry and
national levels. However, our analysis goes further, because we add other institutional
features, rigidities and macroeconomic parameters that also a¤ect wage bargaining. We
include the size and structure of social expenditures, public sector ine¢ ciencies, the labor
force participation rate, labor taxes and the degree of competition in the output market.
We show that the employment rate depends on all these variables together, which means
that empirical research based only on changes in one variable usually yields poor results.
Evidently, the omission of these variables may o¤er an explanation for the lack of
robustness of the hump-shaped hypothesis predicted by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) in the
empirical literature9. In other words, the group of countries that belong to a certain wage
bargaining system may di¤er in the composition of labor taxes, the ine¢ ciency of their
governments, the degree of competition in the goods market, etc.. and we show later that
all these variables also a¤ect wage determination and, therefore the unemployment rate.
In Tables 2 and 3 we show the values of the di¤erent institutional indicators that we
introduce in the model for the period 1998-2008. The theoretical study below investigates
more closely the mechanism through which these variables a¤ect the unemployment rate.
The second column in Table 2 presents the degree of e¢ ciency of the public sector
(GE)10. This variable has been constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). These authors de-
ne government e¢ ciency as an aggregate governance indicator that measures perceptions
of the quality of public service provision, the quality of bureaucracy and the competence
of civil servants among other elements related to the government. This variable is relevant
9See Aidt and Tzanatos (2008), for an excellent survey of these issues.
10See Doménech and García (2008) for an in-depth discussion of this variable.
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for wage determination when the government nances a given level of social expenditure.
The more ine¢ cient the government is, the higher the tax rates necessary to nance a
given government expenditure and, therefore, the greater the e¤ects on employment. In
Figure 2 we present the scatter diagrams of e¢ ciency of the public sector plotted against
our relative index (R2 = 0:09) as in Figure 1.
Figure 2. Goverment e¢ ciency vs relative index of collective bargaining.
Empirical ndings suggest that there is a hump-shaped relationship between bargaining
structure and the degree of e¢ ciency.
The third column in Table 2 provides the degree of rigidity in the goods market
(PMR)11. Rigidities in the product markets comprise all the factors that reduce com-
petition. Many authors point out the relationship between rigidities in the goods markets
and wage setting12. It has argued that when the price elasticity of product demand is low,
rms have more price-setting power. As labour demand is derived, the elasticity of labor
demand with respect to wages is also low. According to this context, the employed workers
will have the opportunity to exercise upward pressure on wages to obtain a proportion of
the surplus prots derived from the price-setting power. Thus, although we assume that
product market competition does not have a direct inuence on union bargaining power,
it does have an indirect impact through the elasticity of labor demand and, thereby on
the resulting wage rate.
A scatter plot of product market rigidity against our relative index (R2 = 0:22) is
shown in Figure 3
11The indicator of product market regulations (PMR) is dened in Conway et. al. (2005). The source
of the database is the webpage http:www.oecd.org/eco/pmr.
12For a more detailed discussion of these issues see, for instance, Nickell (1999), Boeri et.al (2000),
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and OECD (2002) chapter ve.
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Figure 3. Product market regulation vs relative index of collective bargaining.
From the graph above we can see that there is also a hump-shaped pattern between
bargaining structure and the degree of rigidity in the goods market.
Finally, the fourth column in Table 2 shows the average labor force participation rate
elaborated by the OECD (LBPR). In our theoretical model, we assume that this variable
a¤ects the amount of social services that an active worker may receive. A similar analysis
also produces similar ndings: the LBPR displays a hump-shaped relationship whith the
bargaining structure.
What do imply all these empirical regularities for the relationship between the unem-
ployment rate and the Calmfors and Dri¢ ll ´s hypotesis? It is possible that the apparent
relationship between the unemployment rate and bargaining structure is caused by a third
factor (for example, rigidity in the goods market), which signicantly a¤ects unemploy-
ment and also registers an inverted u-shaped relationship respect to bargaining structure13.
The theoretical section provides a more detailed discussion about all the factors that de-
termine the unemployment rate when the wage is negotiated at sector level.
Social security systems and tax structure are other institutions that a¤ect the unem-
ployment rate. For this reason Table 3, Column 1 shows social expenditures with respect to
GDP (SE). These expenditures are basically nanced by social security contributions paid
by workers and employers. Imposition on labor revenues and other taxes plays a minor role
(See OECD (2007))14. Columns 2 to 5 report average tax wedges (TW), income tax (IT)
and employeesand employerssocial contributions (WSC and ESC respectively). The tax
13When one analyzes, the inuence of taxes on unemployment, it seems that other elements must
be taken into account in order to explain the data. The empirical evidence presented by Daveri and
Tabellini (2000) supports the view that in more corporate and decentralized countries, labor taxes are less
distortionary than in countries with an intermediate level of wage bargaining. However, this paper does
not take into account, for example, rigidity in the goods market.
14Only Australia, Denmark and New Zealand do not nance social policy expenditure with social
security contributions.
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Table 2
Rigidities and institutions.
U GE PMR LBPR
ANGLO
USA 4.98 1.74 1.04 78.78
Canada 7.05 2.01 1.13 78.59
Japan 4.57 1.27 1.57 78.69
UK 5.30 1.86 0.91 77.72
New Zealand 5.12 1.86 1.25 78.41
average 5.41 1.75 1.18 78.44
std desv 0.96 0.28 0.25 0.42
EUCON
France 9.12 1.54 1.91 69.05
Switzerland 3.55 2.18 1.79 83.27
Greece 10.04 0.71 2.63 66.28
Australia 5.80 1.93 1.30 76.08
Italy 8.55 0.73 1.93 62.38
Denmark 4.55 2.17 1.28 80.98
Netherlands 3.44 2 1.13 76.21
Spain 10.84 1.42 1.75 69.20
Germany 8.74 1.72 1.66 73.65
Belgium 7.89 1.76 1.73 65.43
Portugal 6.11 1.05 1.77 76.89
Ireland 4.99 1.67 1.31 70.11
average 6.97 1.57 1.68 72.46
std desv 2.55 0.51 0.4 6.43
NORDIC
Sweden 6.67 2.07 1.57 80.69
Norway 3.44 2.05 1.48 81.27
Austria: 4.29 1.83 1.85 72.94
Finland 8.79 2.09 1.52 75.48
average 5.80 2.01 1.61 77.60
std desv 2.42 0.12 0.17 4.05
wedge is computed as the sum of labor income tax and social security contributions paid
by workers and employers15.
As can be seen from Table 3, there are large di¤erences in the composition of the tax
wedge across OECD countries over the period 1988-2008. In general, countries with the
highest labor tax are also those that tend to have the highest social contributions paid
directly by employers.
The most striking results that emerge from the data for EUCON countries, with respect
to the rest of countries, are the following: First, and foremost, the EUCON countries are,
on average, the most ine¢ cient (Table 2, GE average 1.57), have a more regulated goods
15All the e¤ective tax rates have been computed, as suggested in Boscá, García and Taguas (2005),
using the methodology proposed by Mendoza et. al (1994).
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Table 3
Social expenditure and the tax structure.
SE TW IT WSC ESC
ANGLO
USA 15.36 0.25 0.13 0.06 0.06
Canada 16.91 0.30 0.20 0.04 0.06
Japan 17.28 0.24 0.07 0.08 0.09
UK 20.07 0.27 0.14 0.05 0.07
New Zealand 18.92 0.21 0.21 0.0 0.0
average 17.71 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.06
std desv 1.83 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03
EUCON
France 28.68 0.49 0.12 0.10 0.27
Switzerland 19.20 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.06
Greece 19.71 0.39 0.07 0.15 0.18
Australia 17.40 0.18 0.18 0.0 0.0
Italy 23.88 0.51 0.16 0.07 0.27
Denmark 26.81 0.40 0.38 0.02 0.0
Netherlands 20.61 0.34 0.10 0.15 0.1
Spain 20.62 0.38 0.11 0.05 0.22
Germany 26.59 0.41 0.12 0.14 0.15
Belgium 26.12 0.51 0.21 0.10 0.2
Portugal 20.41 0.33 0.09 0.08 0.16
Ireland 14.9 0.27 0.17 0.04 0.07
average 22.08 0.37 0.15 0.08 0.14
std desv 4.27 0.1 0.08 0.05 0.1
NORDIC
Sweden 29.60 0.58 0.28 0.06 0.23
Norway 22.67 0.43 0.2 0.08 0.14
Austria: 26.93 0.45 0.15 0.14 0.16
Finland 25.42 0.55 0.27 0.06 0.23
average 26.23 0.5 0.23 0.08 0.19
std desv 2.78 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05
market (Table 2, PMR average 1.68) and the lowest labor participation rate (Table 2,
LBPR average 72.46), compared to Anglo and Nordic countries; second, in regard to
the nancing of social expenditure, we nd that the social security contribution paid by
employers (Table 3 ESC) in some countries is prominent (e.g. France, Italy and Spain).
As shown below, more ine¢ ciency, more regulated good markets and less internalization
driven by a lower participation rate produces more unemployment in a sector level wage
setting system. So, these characteristics reinforce the higher mean unemployment rate of
this group, besides the centralization system, and suggest that EUCON countries have the
institutional characteristics that can generate a higher unemployment rate than the rest
of countries.
Finally, Table 4 reports the simple correlation using cross-country data between all
11
Table 4
Correlations between institutions and social expenditure.
GE LBPR PMR SE TW ESC
U -0.503* -0.684** 0.546* 0.29 0.469* 0.663**
GE 0.676** -0.636** 0.136 -0.065 -0.434*
LBPR -0.561** -0.168 -0.393 -0.601**
PMR 0.337 0.442* 0.613**
SE 0.860** 0.607**
TW 0.831**
* The correlation is signicant at 0.05 level
** The correlation is signicant at 0.01 level
relevant variables over the period 1998-2008. Since a correlation does not imply causality
in any sense, the existence of signicant correlation suggests a non simple mechanism of
relationship. Table 4 shows that the tax rates paid by employers seem to be positively
related to the unemployment rate (0.663). At the same time, there is a positive correla-
tion between government e¢ ciency and labor force participation rates in OECD countries
(0.676). It is interesting to notice that there is a strong negative correlation between gov-
ernment e¢ ciency and product market regulation (-0.636). Finally, social expenditure and
tax paid by employers are highly correlated (0.613). All these correlations also reinforce
that the specic variable considered in the regression may explain the relatively good/poor
empirical estimations found by di¤erent authors over time.
A more accurate study requires the use of multivariate regression analysis. Unfortu-
nately, these series are relatively recent and it is not possible to obtain a longer sample
period that allows regressions to be performed. However, the di¤erent values that we show
for these variables may explain the relatively good/poor empirical estimations found, de-
pending crucially on the specic variable considered in the regression.
3 Employment rate at sector and rm level.
In this section, we present the short run general equilibrium when wages are set at the
sector and rm level. Its main elements are monopolistic competition in the goods market
and wage bargaining in the labor market. Our innovation lies in taking into account that
the trade union partially internalizes the e¤ect of wages on the social services provided
by government. Moreover, we add other institutional features that also a¤ect wage bar-
gaining. In this framework we solve the symmetric Nash-solution, at sector level and rm
level of bargaining, to determine the wage and employment rate.
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3.1 Labor demand with monopolistic competition.
We assume J 2 [0; 1] sectors with one rm16 per sector that produces a di¤erent good,
Yj (t), using the same production Cobb-Douglas technology, that is:
Yj (t) = AKj (t)
 Lj (t)
1  . (1)
The demand function facing rm J is
Yj(t) =

Pj(t)
P (t)
   
Y(t)

, (2)
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand of product J with respect to its price,
Y(t)  Y (t)
P (t)
is total real expenditures on consumption and investment, Pj(t) is the price
of product j, P (t) is a price index with the usual properties and Yj(t) is the corresponding
quantity demanded of the consumption and investment good produced by rm j 17.
The rm in sector j maximizes the wealth of its shareholders subject to the demand
function (2). Each rm pays a payroll tax,  f , in order to nance social services. The rst
order condition in terms of the real wage is18:
(1  )AKj L j A 
1
K
 

j L
  1  
j =
(1 +  f )m!j
Y(t)
1

, (3)
where the parameter m represents the degree of monopoly or the (price) markup m 
1
(1  1

)
= 1 and !j(t)  Wj(t)P (t) denotes wage in sector j:
Labor demand, in terms of the real wage, is then:
Ldj (t) =
~Ldj (!j(t)) = A
 1
1+( 1)K(t)
( 1)
1+( 1) Y(t)
1
1+( 1) (m
(1 +  f )
(1  ) !j(t))
 
1+( 1) , (4)
where the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the wage is constant and given by:
"Ldj ;!j 
@ ~Ldj (!j)
@!j
!j
~Ldj (!j)
=
 
1 + (   1) =
 1
+ (1 )

. (5)
Note that the elasticity of labor demand depends positively on product market elasticity
, with the property that the greater  is, the higher "Ldj ;!j ; and always "Ldj ;!j <  1.
Therefore, an increase in the real wage always decreases the wage bill !j ~Ldj (!j). In the
particular case of perfect competition we have  =1 and labor demand elasticity is equal
16Alternatively one may assume K 2 [0; 1] rms per sector having, obviously, the same result instead
of considering only one rm per sector.
17For more details see Appendix A.
18This expression comes from equation (42) in the appendix.
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to   1

19.
3.2 Government budget constraint.
Before describing wage bargaining, we need to introduce the government budget constraint.
The government nances the unemployment benets paid to unemployed workers and
social services. To generate revenue, at each period t; the government imposes a at-rate
tax. More specically, L denotes the tax rate paid by employees on wages. This tax
includes income tax plus the social security contribution paid by employees.
We assume that, given a level of taxes collected, more ine¢ cient governments will
produce a lower level of transfers and social services. It can be assumed that this level
of ine¢ ciency will be proportional to the administrative cost of managing tax revenues.
The parameter  stands for the level of ine¢ ciency of the government to nance its public
expenditure20. From all these assumptions, it follows that the governments ow budget
constraint in real terms is:
(1 + ) (S(t) + (N(t)  L(t))B(t)) =  L +  f!(t)L(t), (6)
where S(t) are social services in real terms, B(t) the unemployment benet in real
terms and N(t) the inelastic labor supply (active population).
We consider that part of tax revenues is used to nance social services (such as educa-
tion, the social security system, pensions etc.) and another part is channeled to nancing
the unemployment benets of unemployed workers in each period, so that the following
equalities hold:
(1 + )S(t) = 
 
L +  f

!(t)L(t), (7)
(1 + )B(t)(N(t)  L(t)) = (1  )  L +  f!(t)L(t), (8)
where the parameter  captures the relative weight of the expense in social services, decided
by the government, with respect to tax revenues. Rewriting the last two equations we get:
S(t) = 
 
L +  f

!(t)L(t)
(1 + )
(9)
and
19Alternatively, forcing the model to assume only one rm per sector, we can consider the perfect
competition situation where the rm takes Pj(t) as given. Then, the rst order condition in terms of
Wj(t)
Pj(t)
is FL =
 
1 + f
 Wj(t)
Pj(t)
, labor demand is: Ldj = ~L
d
j (
Wj
Pj
) =
 
(1 )A
(1+f )
Wj
Pj
! 1

Kj and the elasticity with
respect to the real wage is   1 .
20A similar assumption is made by Doménech and García (2008).
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B(t) = (1  )
 
L +  f

!(t)L(t)
(1 + )(N(t)  L(t)) . (10)
Note that, because we assume Land  f are invariant, the last two equations imply
that an increase in the wage always reduces S(t) and B(t), when employment is given by
labor demand, because its elasticity with respect to the real wage is less than  1.
We include the level of public services, S(t), in the utility function of trade unions,
reecting the fact that the welfare of workers depends on the level of social services they
receive21. If we add equation (9), which expresses how public services are nanced, we also
assume that workers have perceptions about how changes in the wage a¤ect the amount
of public services.
3.3 Wage setting at sector and rm level.
We assume a three-stage game for employment decisions. In the rst stage, the rms
decide the level of capital stocks anticipating their e¤ects on the wage setting and labor
demand. In stage two, the wage rate is determined through a process of bargaining between
employers and trade unions. Finally, in stage three, the rm unilaterally determines the
employment level once the conditions of the wage negotiations and investment decisions
have been settled.22
There are j unions in the economy (one for each industry) and, as is common in the
literature when there is a wage setting at sector level, we assume that the labor force Nt
is symmetrically divided between sectors. Moreover, we assume that all the workers in
one sector are members of the sector union that takes cares of them. In our continuous
context, the workers in one sector will, of course, be Nt (
1Z
0
Nt = Nt) and then the utility
function of the jth union is:
Vj = (1  L)!j(t)Ldj (t) +Rj(t)(N(t)  Ldj (t)) + s
(L +  f )!j(t)L
d
j (t)
(1 + )
; (11)
where Rj(t) is the alternative income that a worker receives if he is not employed in the
sector j. Additionally, we assume that the union takes into account that social services
a¤ect the welfare of workers and that the revenues obtained from the wage bill of the
sector may contribute to nance social services23. We introduce the parameter s which
measures the ability of the trade union in sector j to internalize the contribution of the
wage bill in sector j, !jLdj , to the provision of social services
24. It is reasonable to assume
21For a more extensive discussion, see Mares (2004).
22For more details over this issue see, for example, Koskela et al. (2009).
23Details of these hypotheses are given in Mares (2004).
24Alternatively, one can assume that the union only cares for workers that work in sector j and its
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that this parameter is determined by two factors. The rst is the degree of centralization of
wage bargaining. It is very usual in the literature to classify wage setting regimes by their
degree of centralization into three types. Highly centralized systems, such as national level
bargaining, intermediate levels of centralization, where the bargaining process is carried
out at industry level and, nally, negotiation at rm level. We assume that the degree
of internalization s is positively related to the level of centralization of wage bargaining
because the proportion of revenue that nances social services increases. It should be noted
that the value of this parameter will, of course, be not the same for di¤erent countries,
samples of years and economic performance (crisis or expansion)25.
The second factor that will a¤ect the value of parameter s is the share of active
labor force with respect to the inactive population in the economy26. We assume that the
same level of social services is available to the labor force and the inactive population.
Note that the social services for the non active population are nanced by taxes levied
on the active population. Therefore, if unions only care about the social services of the
active population, the higher the inactive population receiving social services, the lower
the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of services and thus the lower the
value of parameter s27. We also assume that the union considers no e¤ect of the wage
bill in sector j on alternative income because, although it is true that the wage bill of the
sector will nance the unemployment benet, the weight of the unemployment benet on
alternative income is small, because it also comprises the wages of all the other sectors.
Turning to wage bargaining, we assume that employers negotiate the sector wage with
the trade union, taking into account that rms retain their right-to-manage power and
determine employment (and capital) after the wage has been set. The outcome of wage bar-
gaining is determined by the Nash-bargaining solution, which maximizes the Nash product 
Vj   Vj
  
j   j
1 
,where  denotes the bargaining power of the trade union. The
fall-back position for the union is Vj = R(t)N(t) and for the rm is given by j =  rtKj28.
For an interior solution, the maximization of the logarithm of the generalized Nash
criterion gives the rst-order condition:
objective is to maximize the income of a worker that works in sector j with respect to the alternative
income of working outside the sector, Rj(t), times employment, the utility function in this case being
V
0
j =

(1  L)!j(t) Rj(t)

Ldj (t)+ s
(L+f )!j(t)L
d
j (t)
(1+) . Nevertheless, as argued below, the result when
using any of these two functions Vj or V
0
j is the same.
25See, for example, Pohjola (1992).
26Prior studies have noted the importance of demographic factors in the utility function of trade unions.
See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Mares (2004).
27In a more formalized way: our active population is N(t) and total population P (t) = (1 + )N(t).
Then social services per person are S(t)P (t) and the social services of active population (the term that enters
the union utility function) is equal to S(t)P (t)N(t) =
S(t)
(1+) .
28If readers prefer the V 0utility function for the j union then they must consider no fall-back position
for the jth union, V 0j = 0, which gives the same expression for Vj and (V
0
j   V 0j ).
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 
Vj   Vj

! 
Vj   Vj
 + (1  ) j   j! 
j   j
 = 0, (12)
where  
Vj   Vj

! 
Vj   Vj
 =  "Ldj + @Ldj@!j !j
# 
(1  L) + (
L +  f )
(1 + )

  Rj
@Ldj
@!j
(13)
and
(1  )
 
j   j

! 
j   j
 = (1  ) 1
!j (m(1  )  1) . (14)
Substituting expressions (13) and (14) into the rst-order condition (12) yields, after some
rearrangement, the following Nash bargaining solution for the wage rate set by union J
!j(t) =

(1  ) +  m
1 
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
iRj(t). (15)
Equation (15) denes the bargained real wage curve under the assumptions made here.
The real wage bargained is a mark-up on the reservation wage Rj(t). Higher market power
increases this mark-up, and thus the wage, as pointed out by Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991) (P. 27) and Spector (2004). It is interesting to note that an increase in ,  and
 f produces a reduction in the mark-up, and thus wage moderation. Alternatively, an
increase in Land  increases the mark-up and thus wage demands.
If the rm behaves competitively, we have, on the one hand, m = 1, which gives the
labor demand elasticity   1

; on the other hand, we assume the internalization parameter
s to be zero because there are many rms and many sectors, the wage bill of one rm
being negligible respect to the total wage bill that nances social services. Then the wage
is:
!f (t) =

(1  ) +  1
1 

(1  L) Rj(t), (16)
having that !f (t) < !j(t) if m is high enough with respect to s29.
This is because in (16) m decreases to 1 and s disappears when comparing with the
expression (15), thus the positive e¤ect of the reduction in monopoly power will dominate
the negative e¤ect of the elimination of the internalization parameter. If we interpret the
wage set in the competitive case (m = 1) as wage setting at rm level, because the union
takes into account the labor demand of a small competitive rm30, then we have wage
29The corresponding condition that guarantees !f (t) < !j(t) is m > 1 +h
(1  ) +  11 
i
(1 )
(1 L)s
(L+f )
(1+) .
30In this case the utility function of the union would be Vf;j =
h
(1  L)WjP  Rj
i
~Ldj (
Wj
Pj
)
where the union chooses Wj , and, one can show that the solution is the above expression.
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restraint at rm level if m is high enough with respect to s.
3.4 Short run general equilibrium at sector and rm level.
In the short run partial equilibrium presented above, the wage bargaining process takes
the alternative income of working outside the sector (or the rm) as given. Nevertheless,
in short run general equilibrium, all sectors set the same price and wages in all rms and
sectors are set in a similar way. As a result R(t) becomes endogenous. We assume that
the alternative income a worker receives, if he does not work in rm or sector j; is given
by31
Rj(t) = l(t)(1  L(t))!e(t) + (1  l(t))B(t); (17)
where l(t) is the employment rate of the economy i.e. l(t)  L(t)
N(t)
, where L(t) = min(Ld(t); N(t))
and Ld(t) =
1Z
0
Ldj (t)dj, !
e(t) is the alternative wage of working outside (rm) sector j
and B(t) is the unemployment benet that an unemployed worker receives.
In a symmetric equilibrium !j(t) = !e(t) = !(t). We assume that the unemployment
benet is nanced by employed workersrevenues and determined by the budget constraint
of the government once it has decided the constant tax rates. Therefore, from (10), it is:
B(t) =
(1  )(L +  f )
(1 + )
!(t)l(t)
(1  l(t)) , (18)
taking into account that !e(t) = !(t) and combining equations (15), (17) and (18) we
obtain:
!(t) = !(t)l(t)

(1  ) +  m
1  
 h(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
i . (19)
Then, the employment rate when wages are set at sector level is:
l(t) =
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
i

(1  ) +  m
1 
 h
(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i = lSL. (20)
This means that the wage equation plus the unemployment benet budget constraint
equation gives, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, a constant employment rate.
Braüninger (2000), in a similar set up, and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) P. 27 also
derive a constant unemployment rate using a wage equation plus a constant exogenous
replacement rate B
!
. There are other ways of obtaining constant employment rates: with
perfect competition and a Cobb-Douglas production function, Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
31Similarly, Romer (2006) p.454 assumes: Rt = (1  but)!t.
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assume B(t) =  Y (t)
L(t)
and Doménech and García (2008) do the same. Raurich and Sorolla
(2011) discuss di¤erent ways of obtaining a constant employment rate when the wage is a
mark-up over the reservation wage. This constant unemployment rate depends crucially
on the use of (10), which, as we said before, means that wage increases produce a reduction
in the unemployment benet32. Papers that assume a constant unemployment benet are,
for example, Pissarides (1998), but in our opinion this assumption in an economy with
growth is worse than assuming constant taxes.
Looking at lSL ; it is easy to see that there is unemployment when m is high enough or
s is low enough, that is, higher monopoly power or a lower proportion of social services
or lower perceptions produce unemployment. Note that @l

s
@m
< 0 and @l

s
@s
> 0, that is, the
lower the level of market power and the higher the degree of internalization, the higher the
employment rate. We also have that @l

s
@
> 0, that is, an increase in the weight of social
services, , increases the employment rate and @l

s
@
< 0 when s >
1 

, that is, an increase
in ine¢ ciency, reduces employment when internalization is high enough.
The e¤ect of the imposition on employment in both cases depends also on the re-
lationship between s and . More specically, @l@L > 0 and
@l
@f
> 0 when s >
1 

.
Finally note, that neither changes in capital K nor in total factor productivity A a¤ect
employment. Therefore, capital and productivity are neutral with respect to unemploy-
ment or, in other words, growth does not a¤ect employment. The reason is that with this
wage setting rule an increase in K or A decreases unemployment, but then the unemploy-
ment benet increases and also the wage, completely crowding out the positive e¤ect of K
or A on labor demand. Kaas and von Thadden (2003) with a CES production function and
Koskela, Stenbacka and Juselius (2009), with a particular production function, obtain an
employment rate that depends on capital. There is also empirical evidence that K a¤ects
employment on the short run (Karanassou et. al. (2008) and Driver and Muñoz-Bugarin
(2009)).
When the wage is set at rm level, the employment rate is equal to
l(t) =
(1  L)
(1  ) +  1
1 
 h
(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i = lFL < 1 (21)
and there is always unemployment. Note that the employment rate does not depend
on m. This may seem strange because from (16), we nd it is the wage that does not
depend on m. The explanation is that an increase in m does not initially change the
wage and, via labor demand, increases unemployment, but, if unemployment increases,
the unemployment benet is reduced, implying, via the wage equation, a decrease in the
32One may argue that real governments do not reduce the unemployment benet when unemployment
increases, but, as we said, a similar result is obtained using B(t) =  Y (t)L(t) :
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wage in such a way that, employment is not a¤ected in the end.
Note nally that, as we argued before, if either m is high enough or s low enough33,
we will have a higher employment rate at rm level, that is lFL > l

SL. This result gives the
condition for the rst part of the inverse U hypothesis to be true, if either market power
is high enough or the degree of internalization of the contribution of labor income to the
provision of social services is low enough. Thus the unemployment rate will be higher if
wages are set at sector level than if they are set at rm level34.
4 Employment rate at national level.
Following Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), P.51, in a symmetric equilibrium Pj(t) =
P (t) for all j and whith, the aggregate price index P (t), labor demand in sector j be-
comes35:
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = m(1 + 
f )
Wj(t)
P (t)
= (1 +  f )m!j(t),
Moreover, in this symmetric equilibrium, Kj(t) = K(t), Lj(t) = L(t) and then the aggre-
gate labor demand,
1Z
0
Lj(t)dj, is also Lj(t) and !j(t) = !(t). This means that aggregate
labor demand is given by the equation:
FL(K(t); L(t)) = (1 + 
f )m!(t), (22)
This expression implies the aggregate labor demand function Ld(t) = ~Ld((1+ f )m!(t); K(t))
where ~L(1+f )m! < 0 and ~LK > 0:More specically, for the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion aggregate labor demand is:
Ld(t) = (1  ) 1A 1 ((1 +  f )m!(t)) 1 K(t),
with elasticity with respect to the wage equal to   1

<  1, that also does not depend on
market power, m, as is the case when the rm acts competitively.
Now, we assume that, in a centralized wage setting system, the national union maxi-
mizes the utility function given by:
33The corresponding condition that guarantees that lFL > l

SL is
m 1
s
>
h
(L+f )
(1+)
i
1 +
(1 L) .
34A more sophisticated situation is to consider that centralization increases as the proportion of sectors
 that sets the same wage for the entire sector increases. In this situation it is not di¢ cult to prove that
the employment rate decreases (increases) monotonically with  from lFL ( = 0) to l

SL( = 1) when
lFL > l

SL(l

FL < l

SL).
35This assumption implies that product demand and then market power disappears from the program
of the rm.
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V = (1  L)!(t)L(t) + (N(t)  L(t))B(t) + n(
L +  f )!(t)L(t)
(1 + )
(23)
where
L(t) = min(N(t); Ld(t)).
We assume, as argued previously, that n > s. At centralized level it also seems rea-
sonable to assume that the national union has perceptions about how the wage will a¤ect
the unemployment benet in a similar way to how it considers it a¤ects social expendi-
tures. The most plausible assumption is that the union internalizes what the government
really does, that is: the national union considers that changing the wage, the wage bill and
the amount of employment will change and then also the unemployment benet according
to the equation:
B(t) = '
(1  )
(1 + )
(L +  f )!(t)L(t)
(N(t)  L(t)) (24)
where 0 < ' 5 1 measures the degree of internalization of the e¤ect of the wage on the
unemployment benet, that is, the union internalizes, in part, exactly what the government
does. With a Cobb-Douglas utility function, this means that the union now considers that
an increase in the wage bill reduces the unemployment benet because !(t)L(t) decreases
and (N(t)   L(t)) increases. Substituting (24) in (23), the utility function of the union
becomes:
VB =

1  L + ['(1  ) + n] (
L +  f )
(1 + )

!(t)L(t) (25)
and in this case it is obvious that it chooses the competitive wage because labor demand
elasticity with respect to the wage is equal to   1

and an increase in the wage always
reduces the wage bill, !(t)L(t). In this case, therefore, there is full employment, that is,
lNL = 1 and l

NL > l

S if m is high enough or s is low enough.
Alternatively, we may assume that the union internalizes a di¤erent e¤ect of the wage.
For example, it may consider that by changing the wage, the wage bill and the amount of
employment will change and then the government will maintain the unemployment benet
and the tax rate on employers constant, changing the tax rate on workers36. In this case,
one can show that it may be unemployment at national level and, as usual, the employment
level is higher at the national level if m is high enough or s is low enough. The other
alternative assumption is that the union does not internalize the e¤ect of the wage on the
unemployment benet. In this case, one can show that there is always unemployment and,
36Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) on P. 130 consider the case where an increase in the wage is
completely transferred to an increase in workerstaxes which results in the union settings the competitive
wage.
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again as usual, the employment level is higher at national level if m is high enough or s
is low enough.
Therefore, obtaining unemployment or full employment in the centralized wage setting
system depends heavily on what the union assumes is going to happen when the wage it
sets increases. If it thinks that an increase in the wage will decrease the unemployment
benet, then we have full employment. Another option is to assume that an increase in
the wage will increase workerstaxes resulting, in general, unemployment. Finally, the
trade union may assume that neither the unemployment benet nor taxes on employed
workers will change, and so, there is unemployment.
Note also that a higher degree of market power does not a¤ect any of the employment
rates obtained when wages are set at national level for the same reason as when they are
set at rm level. In all three cases we have a higher employment rate when wages are set
at national level than when wages are set at sector level if m is high enough or s is low
enough.
From all this, we should expect an inverse U relationship between unemployment and
the degree of centralization of wage setting under two circumstances. The rst is when
the degree of market power in the product market is high enough. The second is when
the degree of internalization of the contribution of labor income to the provision of social
services is small enough at sector level. All these results appear in a scenario where market
power produces lower labor demand elasticity at sector level. The last argument is similar
to Calmfors and Dri¢ ls assumption that the elasticity of labor demand decreases with
the degree of centralization, but we have a strong argument for this assumption: the
consideration of market power when wages are set at sector level.
Note nally, that this relationship occurs when all the other parameters that appear in
the model: , L,  f , ... do not change. Therefore, it is not surprising that if one checks
for the inverse U hypothesis without controlling for the other parameters that a¤ect the
employment rate, the relationship does not appear.
5 Households and equilibrium
In this section we investigate, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between in-
come per capita and the bargaining system. We provide the empirical evidence through a
scatter plot of income per capita against our bargaining index (R2 = 0:14) in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. PIB per capita vs Relative index of collective bargaining
From the Figure above we can see that a U-shaped pattern also appears between both
variables (Finland is excluded).
The theoretical framework for this relationship can be illustrated briey through a
simple growth model. More specically, we use the innite horizon model where there
is a representative family with N(t) members growing at the constant rate n, with an
inelastic labor supply equal to N(t) that (see Galí (1996) section 2.1) chooses aggregate
consumption per capita, c(t) 
1Z
0
cj(t)dj, where cj(t)  Cj(t)N(t) , in order to maximize:
1Z
t=0
e ( n)t

c(t)1    1
1  

(26)
subject to:
_a(t) = (1  )w(t)l(t) + s(t)(1  l(t))  e(t) +
1Z
0
(dj(t) + _qj(t))sj(t)dj   na(t). (27)
where sj(t) is the number of shares per capita in rm j held at time t by the family. A
share in rm j trades at price qj(t) and generates a dividend ow dj(t) at time t. Financial
wealth of the family is thus given by A(t) =
1Z
0
qj(t))N(t)sj(t)dj and then a(t)  A(t)N(t) .
Note that the revenues of this family accrue from total labor income because we assume
the family is so large that it considers all workers, employed and unemployed. Daveri and
Ma¤ezzoli (2000), Eriksson (1997) and Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2006) also use the
large family assumption. If we have heterogeneous agents, instead of a large family, the
solution does not change as long as we assume complete competitive insurance markets
23
for unemployment or that the union pursues a redistributive goal, acting as a substitute
for insurance markets (Ma¤ezzoli (2001) and Benassy (1997)).
In market equilibrium we obtain (see Galí (1996)):
_c(t)
c(t)
=
1


1
m
FK(k(t); l(t))  (+ )

, (28)
_k(t) = f(k(t); l(t))  c(t)  (n+ )k(t). (29)
Where k(t) is capital per capita and F (k; l) is the production function per capita (see
appendix). Under the assumptions established in the section above, we obtain a constant
employment rate lt = l: Taking into account this result, the above expressions may be
written as follows:
_c(t)
c(t)
=
1


1
m
FK(k(t); l
)  (+ )

, (30)
_k(t) = F (k(t); l)  ct   (n+ )k(t). (31)
As l < 1, it is clear from (31) that the rate of growth of capital per capita is lower for a
given level of c and k in a model with unemployment, that is, employment a¤ects growth
in the short run. It is also clear, from (30) and (31), that consumption and capital per
capita converge to a steady state with a zero rate of growth of capital per capita and
consumption per capita. That means that there is no relationship between growth and
unemployment in the long run: the constant rate of unemployment is given by l and the
rate of growth in income per capita is zero, or x, if we introduce exogenous technological
progress growing at the constant rate x. It is also easy to see, by drawing at phase diagram,
that a decrease in l decreases the long run level of consumption, capital and income per
capita, that is, there is a positive relationship between income, capital and consumption
per capita and the employment rate in the long run. In other words, all other parameters
equal, economies with a higher employment rate will record higher income, capital and
consumption per capita in the long run.
On the other hand, the level of capital per worker and income per worker in the long
run does not depend on the employment rate because we can rewrite (30) as
_c(t)
c(t)
=
1


1
m
f(k^(t))  (+ )

, (32)
where k^ is capital per unit of labor and f(k^) the production function in intensive form,
and, hence, in the long run k^ is given by:
0 =
1


1
m
f(k^)  (+ )

. (33)
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Then, all other parameters remaining equal, we also have a U relationship between long
run income, capital and consumption per capita and the degree of centralization of wage
setting when the degree of market power, in the product market, is high enough and there
is no relationship between capital and income per worker and the degree of centralization
of wage setting.
Finally, as we saw, an increase in market power increases unemployment when the wage
is set at sector level, but has no e¤ect when it is set at rm and national level. However,
in all three systems it produces a decrease in long run income, capital and consumption
per capita and in capital and income per worker.
6 Main Results
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of collective bargaining on the employment rate in OECD
countries focusing our attention, principally, on the intermediate level of bargaining. This
sample of countries has a higher unemployment rate than other countries characterized by
highly centralized and decentralized wage bargaining structures. It follows from this result
that the relationship between the unemployment rate and wage bargaining systems can be
hump-shaped (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll 1988). In this paper, we open the framework elabo-
rated by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll in three directions: there is monopolistic competition in the
product market, we include some key variables that determine labor market performance
and, nally, we assume that trade unions at sectorial level are able to partially internalize
the e¤ect of the wage on social services provided by the government. It is worthwhile
stressing that there are two types of variables. The rst group includes variables under
the direct control of policy makers: such as the size and structure of social expenditures
and labor taxes. The second group includes variables describing the socioeconomic struc-
ture, such as public sector ine¢ ciencies, the degree of internalization of social services and
rigidities in goods markets.
The results obtained show that a high degree of market power normally produces the
inverted-U form for the unemployment rate. Moreover, we also illustrate that this inverse
U form can be reversed when the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of
social services is great enough at sector level. The market power e¤ect produces higher
labor demand elasticity at sector level than at other levels of wage bargaining. It should
be noted that this relationship occurs when all the other parameters that appear in the
model under the direct control of government or describing the socioeconomic structure
are the same. One possible empirical implication of these results is that, if one checks
for the inverted-U hypothesis without controlling for all the parameters that a¤ect the
employment rate, the relationship does not appear. Thus, the paper o¤ers an explanation
for the weak relationship between the wage bargaining system and the employment rate
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that has been found in a large number of studies. As we described above in section 2,
the empirical evidence reveals strong heterogeneity for the parameters that determine the
rate of unemployment in the theoretical model of this paper for the sample of countries
presented. This results in the unemployment rate obtained being very heterogeneous.
Our analysis also nds a U-shaped relationship between long run income, capital and
consumption per capita and the degree of collective bargaining. Finally, an increase in
market power increases unemployment, when the wage is set at sector level, but has no
e¤ect when it is set at rm and national level. However, in all three systems it produces
a decrease in long run income, capital and consumption per capita and in capital and
income per worker.
These results have important implications for policy makers who plan to implement
labor market reforms in order to reduce unemployment in countries characterized by collec-
tive bargaining at sector level. First, based on the empirical evidence of section 2 and the
model presented, our (modest) advice for improving the employment rate of the EUCON
countries in general is to reduce government ine¢ ciencies and market power. However, for
more rened advice, one must analyze the specic characteristics for every country of the
variables that determine the unemployment rate in the model, such as social expenditure
structure, government e¢ ciency, etc.
The second policy implication is that, if sector unions internalize the e¤ect of the
wage on the social services o¤ered by government to the labor force, one obtains a higher
employment rate than when the collective bargaining is at rm level. It should be noted
that it seems easier to coordinate bargaining between trade unions during an economic
crisis than during an expansion (see, Pohjola (1992)). On the other hand, it is worthwhile
stressing that the share of the active labor force with respect to the inactive population is
a limiting factor for internalizing social services.
It is important to emphasize that the empirical evidence presented only shows as-
sociations, not causal e¤ects. Further data collection is required in order to perform
conventional multivariate regressions, this issue being our future line of research.
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7.1 Appendix 1
We introduce the monopolistic competition set up in a growth model (Galí (1996)) hav-
ing j 2 [0; 1] sectors with one rm per sector that produces product Yj(t). Production
functions at sector and rm level are characterized by function
Yj(t) = F (Kj(t); Lj(t)), (34)
with constant returns to scale with respect to K and L, FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0,
FLL < 0 and the Inada conditions: LimK!0FK =1, LimK!1FK = 0, LimL!0FL =1,
LimL!1FL = 0. The production function in terms of output per worker or unit of labor,
Yj(t)
Lj(t)
 y^j(t), and capital per worker or the capital labor ratio, Kj(t)Lj((t)  k^j(t), that is, in
intensive form, is:
y^j(t) = f(k^j(t)), (35)
where f 0 > 0 and f< 0.
Finally we also rewrite the production function in per capita terms Yj(t)
N(t)
 yj(t),
Kj(t)
N(t)
 kj(t), Lj(t)N(t)  lj(t), where N(t) is population a time t. In this case, we have:
yj(t)  Yj(t)
N(t)
= F (
Kj(t)
N(t)
;
Lj(t)
N(t)
)  F (kj(t); lj(t)), (36)
with Fk = FK and Fl = FL .
The stock of capital for rm j evolves according to the equation:
_Kj(t) = Ij(t)  Kj(t), (37)
where Ij(t) is a composite of the ow of purchases by rm j of the good produced by
rm h, Ij;h(t)37.
The rm in sector j maximizes the wealth of its shareholders subject to the demand
function. The demand function in sector j is the sum of the demands of consumers and
rms (Galí (1996) equation (2.7)):
Yj(t) =

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
E(t)
P (t)

+

Pj(t)
(t)
  
Z(t)
(t)

, (38)
where P (t) is the aggregate price index P (t) 
0@ 1Z
0
Pj(t)
1 dj
1A
1
1 
, E(t) is the ow of ex-
37As dened below Ij(t)  Zj(t)(t) .
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penditure in consumption goods E(t) 
1Z
0
Pj(t)Cj(t)dj, Z(t) is the ow of expenditure in
investment goods, Z(t) 
1Z
0
Zj(t)dj, that is the sum for all sectors of expenditures in Ij(t),
Zj(t) 
1Z
0
Ph(t)Ij;h(t)dh, (t) is the aggregate price index (t) 
0@ 1Z
0
Pj(t)
1 dj
1A
1
1 
and
 and  are the constant price elasticity of the consumer and rms demand functions. Fi-
nally,  > 1 denotes the (exogenously given) elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
goods form the viewpoint of the rm which uses them as inputs (Galí (1996), P.255).
Assuming that the price elasticity of the demands of consumers and rms is equal to 38
, equation (38) becomes.
Yj(t) =

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
E(t)
P (t)

+

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
Z(t)
P (t)

=

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
E(t) + Z(t)
P (t)

(39)
=

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
Y (t)
P (t)

=

Pj(t)
P (t)
   
Y(t)

where Y (t)  E(t) + Z(t) and Y(t)  Y (t)
P (t)
is total real expenditures on consumption and
investment. The aggregate price index is now P (t) 
0@ 1Z
0
Pj(t)
1 dj
1A
1
1 
.
Dening m  1
(1  1

)
> 1, as the monopoly degree or the markup, from the solution to
the program of the rm, we obtain the following rst order condition for rm j (see again
Galí (1996), equation 2.11) with the payroll taxes properly added:
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = (1 + 
f )m
Wj(t)
Pj(t)
; (40)
and then
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = (1 + 
f )m
Wj(t)
P (t)
Pj(t)
P (t)
= (1 +  f )m!j(t)
Yj(t)
1

Y(t)
1

(41)
= (1 +  f )m!j(t)
F (Kj(t); Lj(t))
1

Y(t)
1

38The complication of the monopolistic competition set up in a growth model arises from the fact that
both consumers and rms demand product i due to the demand of capital of each rm. On principle the
price elasticity of both types of demand may be di¤erent, this is the point of Galis paper, and this opens
the door for multiplicity of equilibria. The assumption that  is constant is the  =  case in Gali´s
paper.
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where !j(t)  Wj(t)P (t) is the real wage in sector j. We can rewrite equation (41) as:
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t))F (Kj(t); Lj(t))
  1
 =
(1 +  f )m!j(t)
Y(t)
1

(42)
and from the last equation39 we get the"labor demand" function for sector j:
Ldj (t) = ~Lj((1 + 
f )m!j(t); Kj(t); Y(t)), (43)
where ~Lj;m!j < 0 and ~Lj;Y > 0:
Because FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = f(k^j(t)) k^j(t)f 0(k^j(t)), equation (41) can also be rewritten
in terms of the production function in intensive form as:
f(k^j(t))  k^j(t)f 0(k^j(t)) = mWj(t)
Pj(t)
, (44)
which gives the capital labor ratio function:
k^j(t) = ~k

m
Wj(t)
Pj(t)

, (45)
with ~k0 > 0.
39We can also rewrite this condition in terms of the capital labor ratio as:
h
f(k^j)  k^jf 0(k^j)
i
f(k^j)
  1 =
m!j
( YL )
1

.
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